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CHAPTER 21 
Evidence 
FREDERICK A. MC DERMOTT 
§21.1. Judicial notice: Conclusiveness of blood-grouping tests. 
Commonwealth v. D'Avella1 was a case of first impression in the Com-
monwealth. In a prosecution for getting the complainant with child 
in violation of G.L., c. 273, §ll, after the Commonwealth had made out 
a prima facie case by testimony of the complainant, the defendant in-
troduced the report of an expert as to the negative results of blood-
grouping tests made under the provisions of G.L., c. 273, §12A, in-
serted by Acts of 1954, c. 232,2 and his testimony that on the basis of the 
tests the defendant could not be the father of the child. The Common-
wealth conceded that the tests were properly made by a qualified ex-
pert. The Court denied the defendant's requests for a ruling to the 
effect that he was entitled to a finding of not guilty as a matter of law, 
and, sitting without a jury, found the defendant guilty. 
The question whether, as a matter of law, the scientific principle un-
derlying blood-grouping tests is regarded as conclusive was thus raised. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contention of the Common-
wealth that, by providing that negative results of such tests "shall be 
admissible in evidence," the legislature intended to leave the trier of 
fact free to evaluate the weight to be given them, and held that it was 
for the court to determine their evidentiary effect. The opinion judi-
cially noticed that the "overwhelming weight of scientific opinion" 3 
held the tests to be conclusive, and sustained the defendant's exceptions 
to the denial of his requests. 
FREDERICK A. McDERMOTI is Dean and Professor of Law at Suffolk University 
Law School and a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars. He is a member 
of the Boston Bar Association Committees on Civil Procedure and Legal Education. 
§21.1. 1399 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959). 
2 Section 12A reads: "In any proceeding to determine the question of paternity, 
the court, on motion of the defendant, shall order the mother, her child and the 
defendant to submit to one or more blood-grouping tests, to be made by a duly 
qualified physician or other duly qualified person, designated by the court, to 
determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father 
of the child. The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in 
cases where definite exclusion of the defendant as such father has been established. 
If one of the parties refuses to comply with the order of the court relative to such 
tests, such fact shall be admissible in evidence in such proceeding unless the court, 
for good cause, orders otherwise." 
3339 Mass. 642, 645-646,162 N.E.2d 19,21 (1959). 
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As the Court points out, the decision is limited to situations in which 
there is no issue as to the correctness of the administration of the tests. 
A further implicit refinement of this restriction should be made ex-
press. The terms of the concession made by the Commonwealth, as 
stated in the opinion, were merely that the tests were properly made 
. by a qualified expert, and the Court in qualifying its decision only 
specifically limited it to "situations where, as here, there is no dispute 
concerning the accuracy of the tests." 4 Although neither statement 
made any reference expressly to the report and testimony introduced 
at the trial concerning the tests, it is clear that the Court construed the 
concession to include, and intended its own qualification of the appli-
cability of the decision to require, admission of the accuracy of the re-
port and of the testimony introduced in the trial concerning the tests 
and their results. 
The negative results of such tests were earlier held to be admissible 
on common law principles of the law of evidence in Commonwealth v. 
Stappen,5 a nonsupport case, but there it was held only that the nega-
tive test was admissible because it would dissolve the presumption of 
legitimacy. The holding in the Stappen case clearly foreshadowed the 
decision in D' Avella, however, for the so-called "presumption" of legit-
imacy is dissolved only by evidence that persuades the trier of fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt.6 
The decision is clearly sound. As the Court said, when a scientific 
principle is regarded by those expert in the field as established, a ruling 
that would permit the caprice of the fact-finder to find either in accord 
therewith or to the contrary would be "egregiously unrealistic." 7 This 
position appears to be indisputable and, to this writer at least, to entail 
certain inescapable corollaries, which may here be briefly stated with-
out attempt at documentation. 
Whenever a scientific proposition is relevant on an issue, its status 
among those expert in the field is properly the question, and this should 
be the subject of judicial notice. The validity of a scientific proposi-
tion should not be allowed to be the subject of testimony as to the per-
sonal opinion of a witness or witnesses, however expert, nor should it 
be submitted to the lottery of a fact-finding. 
When those expert in the field regard the proposition as established 
as a valid scientific principle, it should be applied as a matter of law, 
as was held in the D' Avella case, because to submit it to fact-finding 
would be absurd. By parity of reasoning, when th~se expert in the field 
regard its validity as nil, or as in doubt because of substantial disagree-
4 339 Mass. at 646, 162 N .E.2d at 21. 
Ii 336 Mass. 174, 143 N.E.2d 221 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann, Surv. Mass. Law §§19.'6, 
23.5,33.2. 
6 Thayer categorized the "presumption of legitimacy," together with the "pre-
sumption of innocence" of a defendant in a criminal prosecution, as exceptional, 
and properly, it seems, described them as presumptions coupled with a special rule 
as to the burden of proof. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence 
336,337.563,576 (1898). 
7339 Mass. 642, 645, 162 N.E.2d 19,21 (1959). 
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ment thereon among the experts, the court should rule accordingly; in 
such a case, if validity of the proposition as a scientific principle is es-
sential to a party on a particular issue, that party should lose on that 
issue as a matter of law. The personal opinion of expert witnesses as 
to the validity of the proposition, whether conflicting or in agreement, 
should be excluded, since it would be equally objectionable to allow 
the fact-finder, on the basis of such evidence, to treat as an established 
scientific principle a proposition that the experts in the field reject or 
upon which they are in substantial doubt or disagreement. 
Objection to the suggested requirement of judicial notice in all such 
situations on the ground that the judge may not "know" the status of 
the particular scientific proposition among the experts is not well 
grounded. The trial judge is not expected nor required to know the 
answers nor to research the questions. It is the duty of counsel to see 
that the trial court is informed as to the status of the proposition, so 
that judicial notice may properly be taken, as in the situation when a 
party relies upon foreign law.8 If either party fails to inform the court' 
properly as to the status of the proposition among experts in the field, 
he cannot as of right complain if judicial notice thereof is not taken, 
or taken upon an adequate presentation of information by the oppo-
nent. In other words, the validity of a scientific proposition should 
always be determined as a matter of law, and never be allowed to be the 
subject of fact-finding. 
Returning after this frolic to the D'Avella opinion, it is clear that the 
concession by the Commonwealth was crucial to the decision. How-
ever, even when the issues of the correctness of the administration of the 
tests, and of the accuracy of the report and testimony as to the results 
thereof are not foreclosed by a concession such as was made in the 
D' Avella case, it would be proper, as the Court also noted, for the trial 
or appellate court to set aside a verdict or finding of guilty rendered in 
the face of evidence of negative results of blood-grouping tests when it 
is deemed to be against the weight of the evidence, and to order a new 
tria1.9 
A caveat may, however, here be sounded. There appears to be some-
what of a tendency to "go overboard" manifest in such situations. 
When they are not conceded, as they were in the D' Avella case, the 
questions of the correctness of the procedure actually employed in the 
administration of the tests and of the accuracy of their reporting in the 
evidence remain in the trial as fact issues upon which the defendant has 
the burden of proof. Although the validity of the scientific principle 
underlying blood-grouping tests must rightly be upheld as conclusive, 
because of its general acceptance by experts in the field, the sanctity of 
the principle is, of course, no guarantee of its proper application in any 
particular test procedure.10 
8 C.L .• c. 231. §70. 
9 Jordan v. Mace. 144 Me. 351. 69 A.2d 670 (1949). 
10 Press sources generally regarded as reliable recently carried a report of wide-
spread scandalous conditions among many of the 425 commercial laboratories in 
3
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While it is undoubtedly true that outright fraud in tests made by rep-
utable technicians is extremely unlikely, the possibility of human error, 
carelessness, or wanton disregard on the part of a particular individual 
in a procedure involved in making a test, in recording the steps, or in 
transcribing the results 'into a report, even under a "foolproof" system, 
can never be ignored.H 
There appears, however, to be a regrettable tendency on the part of 
appellate courts to slip over this point, usually with a gloss to the effect 
that "There was no dispute with respect to the integrity of the tests." 12 
It is, of course, true that customarily there is in the case no evidence 
for the complainant· in the form of a direct attack upon the tests, nor 
could such evidence be reasonably expected to be available, even when 
there had been glaring departures from proper procedure in the tests 
or in the recording or transcription of the results thereof. Such state-
ments of appellate courts have the practical effect, however, of arbitrar-
ily ruling as if the prosecution had admitted or conceded facts upon 
which the defendant has the burden of proof, in total disregard of the 
state of the evidence. Whenever the defendant is put to his proof, 
which, of course, presupposes that the complainant has testified to the 
effect that the defendant was "the only one," there is in the case evi-
dence that circumstantially attacks the validity of the test procedures 
or reporting, without involving any disregard of the sanctity of the 
scientific principle underlying blood tests. 
While the stress of the circumstances, the character of the complain-
ant, and the ease of fabrication may rightly render the complainant's 
testimony subject to suspicion and cautious scrutiny, and such credibil-
ity as it might initially warrant may well be easily destroyed, in the 
judgment of both the jury and the trial court, by impressive testimony 
as to the systematic care taken in all aspects of the tests, these proper 
considerations fall far short of warranting statements that in substance 
amount to rulings that the testimony of the complainant, when met by 
testimony as to a negative paternity test, is not to be considered by the 
fact-finder. When the concession made by the prosecution in the 
D'Avella case has neither expressly nor by fair implication been made, 
it should not be assumed. 
New York City. See Time, October 20, 1960, pp. 55·56, including a quotation of 
Dr. Morris Schaeffer, head of the Bureau of Laboratories, New York City Health 
Department, to the effect that "only one out of four laboratories could perform a 
proper blood typing and grouping. Only one olit of three could do a correct blood 
chemistry test." See also Newsweek, October 24, 1960, p. 55. One is reminded of 
the old saw, "Figgers don't lie, but liars do figger." Some of the larger New York 
City laboratories carryon an extensive mail-order business, involving other areas of 
the country as well. 
11 For who, then, shall check the checkers? See Prudential Trust Co. v. Hayes, 
247 Mass. 311, 142 N.E. 73 (1924), a leading case on the evidential effect of testimony 
as to an institutional or office procedure. See also Anderson v. Town of Billerica, 
309 Mass. 516, 36 N .E.2d 393 (1941). 
12 E.g., Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 646, 162 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1959), 
commenting on Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949), in which there was 
no concession such as that in the D'Avella case. 
4
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§21.2. Circumstantial evidence: Inference; probability or possi. 
bility. A number of cases decided during the 1960 SURVEY year dealt 
with the propriety of an inference in rather interesting fact situations. 
In two of the cases selected for comment, an inference was held to be 
warranted. Pintsopolous v. Home Insurance CO.l held that the dis-
covery of about a quart of fine beach sand in the motor of a tractor that 
had suddenly stopped working, with testimony of an expert mechanic 
that the sand could not enter the motor under ordinary working con-
ditions through either the oil or the air intake, warranted the jury in 
believing that there was a greater probability that the presence of the 
sand was caused by malicious mischief or vandalism rather than by acci-
dental or negligent means or normal use. 
In Commonwealth v. Norton2 there was testimony that the defendant 
had by armed robbery taken a money bag containing cash and checks 
in Boston, and that some four months later the money bag was found 
in a wooded area in Westwood. When found it contained, in addition 
to some of the checks stolen at the time of the robbery, a letter ad-
dressed to the wife of the defendant at their home which, according 
to the postmark, had gone through the mail about ten days before the 
robbery. It was held that while the letter alone would not be sufficient 
to establish the defendant's guilt, its presence in the stolen money bag 
was admissible as evidence corroborating the testimony as to the de-
fendant's participation in the robbery. The Court adverted to the 
presumption that the letter had been duly delivered,3 and to the fact 
that it must have been deposited or dropped into the bag by the defend-
ant's wife or someone to whom both bag and letter were accessible. 
The bag and its contents were held to have been properly admitted in 
evidence. 
In other instances litigants were not successful in their attempts to 
establish facts by circumstantial evidence. Thus, in Sherman v. Texas 
CO.,4 it was held that a plaintiff who was injured on the premises of a 
gasoline station that displayed the standard Texaco insignia, color 
scheme and pump, was not warranted in concluding therefrom that 
the defendant company held itself out as the proprietor of the station. 
It was ruled that the display, even with the consent of the company, 
went no further than the equivalent of a statement that Texaco gaso-
line was sold therein. The Court noted that it is common knowledge 
that these trademark indicia are displayed by independent dealers as 
well as by stations operated by the supplier.1i 
A close question was resolved in the defendant's favor in Parsons v. 
§21.2. 1 340 Mass. 734, 166 N.E.2d 559 (1960). 
, 2339 Mass. 592,161 N.E.2d 766 (1959). 
3 Hobart-Farrell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Klayman, 302 Mass. 508, 509-510, 19 
N.E.2d 805, 807 (1939). 
4340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 916 (1960). 
Ii It should be noted that the Court expressly prescinded from deciding what 
effect, if any, the representation of control by the company contended for by the 
plaintiff would have had in this case, had such a finding been warranted. 
5
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Ryan.6 Testimony to the effect that the defendant operator of an auto-
mobile, who was suspected of having struck the plaintiff in a hit-and-
run accident, had acted evasively and made false statements when ques-
tioned, and that there was no other car in the vicinity at the time of the 
accident, was assumed, without decision, to be sufficient to warrant a 
finding that the automobile driven by the defendant struck the plain-
tiff_ This evidence, however, was held to fall short of creating a proba-
bility of negligent operation as the cause of the accident. Said the 
Court: 
Censurable yielding to the impulse to avoid the inevitable in-
convenience of proved involvement and the risk of liability could 
be taken fully to account for what Ryan did and said .... "An 
implied admission of this sort may turn the scale where the evi-
dence is conflicting. But it forms an insufficient foundation for the 
erection of an entire case by mere inference without other evi-
dence." (Emphasis supplied.)1 
The decision is, as has been indicated, a close one, and no purpose 
would be served by quibbling over its merits, even if one were so dis-
posed. A more trenchant observation should, however, be made. The 
undoubtedly inadvertent use of the adjective "mere" in connection with 
"inference" in the quoted language is understandable in view of the 
conclusion toward which the Court was heading, but the use of both 
words in that context is not only incorrect but most unfortunate. How 
does any evidence, whether circumstantial or testimonial, ever operate 
as such save through inference? There is already sufficient tendency 
for defense counsel to argue and trial courts to rule, in effect, that a 
probability as shown by circumstantial evidence does not suffice to get 
a question to the jury, even in civil cases. Where that tendency 
exists it will unfortunately be encouraged by such statements, which 
may be parrotted to prove conclusively the inherent inadequacy of 
"mere inference," as opposed to "evidence," to warrant the finding of a 
fact in issue.s The thought intended in the last sentence in the quota-
tion from the Court's opinion could well be more properly phrased 
somewhat as follows: But it forms an insufficient foundation for the 
erection of an entire case, since without other evidence it does not war-
rant an inference, but only speculation, surmise or conjecture as to the 
facts required to be proved. 
Another case pointed up a salutary warning for plaintiff's counsel in 
automobile accident and other cases in which the identity of the de-
fendant and the alleged wrongdoer may be challenged. The usual gen-
6340 Mass. 245, 163 N.E.2d 293 (1960). 
7340 Mass. at 249, 163 N.E.2d at 296. The last two sentences are quoted by the 
Court from Credit Service Corp. v. Barker, 308 Mass. 476, 481, 33 N.E.2d 293, 295 
(1941). 
S Perhaps it must regrettably be admitted that a trial judge, who was reported to 
have announced that in his court he wanted "evidence, not inferences" had more 
support in the cases than would be supposed. 
6
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eral denial of course raises the issue, although it is often not insisted 
upon to the extent possible under the pleadings and the evidence. In 
Lodge v. Congress Taxi Assn., Inc.,9 the plaintiff was injured in a col-
lision between another automobile and the taxi in which she was riding. 
The plaintiff sued the corporate defendant as the owner of the cab, and 
the individual defendant as its operator. The evidence was held to 
establish ownership of the taxi by the corporate defendant and negli-
gent operation for which it was responsible. 
On the issue of identity of the individual defendant and the operator 
of the cab, however, the only evidence was testimony that the driver 
gave his address, and his name as "Whitney Rogavey," 10 and the fact 
that the suit against the alleged operator was brought against one Whit-
ney Rogavey. It was held that such bald identity of name without con-
firmatory facts or circumstances was not sufficient to prove identity of 
the persons, although it was conceded that very slight additional evi-
dence would be enough. Thus, the Court noted that, in an earlier 
case,n the return of service on the writ showed that it was served on the 
defendant by leaving the summons at an address that was the same as 
that given by the operator, which was held to be sufficient additional 
evidence to show identity. The action in Lodge, unfortunately for 
the plaintiff, was instituted by service in hand on the defendant Whit-
ney Rogavey. 
§21.3. Circumstantial evidence: Presumption; assumption of nor-
malcy of plaintiff's skin. A decision of importance in the field of 
product liability was Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth CO.1 in which it 
was squarely held that when the question involves allergy or sensitivity, 
the assumption that a human being is normal has the force of a classic 
or Thayerian presumption only, and not that of an inference alone, nor 
that of prima facie evidence, which combines the effect of both a pre-
sumption and an inference. 
The plaintiff's case consisted in substance of her own testimony to the 
effect that an irritation began in her armpits about an hour after ap-
plication of a deodorant, "Mum," which she had purchased from the 
defendant retailer, that she had used the product daily for about twenty 
years, had never had skin trouble, and was not bothered by nervous or 
emotional problems at the time. From this evidence, and the assump-
tion that a human being is normal, the Supreme Judicial Court stated, 
"it could have been inferred that the product was a sensitizer, unmer-
chantable without a suitable warning." 2 It appears that on this pos-
9340 Mass. 570,165 N.E.2d 94 (1960). 
10 The hearsay aspects of this testimony were not expressly referred to in the 
opinion. 
11 Ryan v. DiPaolo, 313 Mass. 492, 494-495, 47 N.E.2d 941, 942 (1943). 
§21.3. 1340 Mass. 552,165 N.E.2d 109 (1960). 
2340 Mass. at 555, 165 N.E.2d at 111-112. The reference here to the process of 
inference, it seems, would apply only to the fact question as to the credibility of the 
plaintiff. If the plaintiff was believed by the jury, the conclusion that the product 
was unmerchantable would be compelled by the presumption that her skin was 
normal, and thus in this respect would present a question of law and not one of fact. 
7
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ture of the case it could at least as well have been inferred that the par-
ticular jar of Mum used by the plaintiff contained a primary irritant 
and was completely unmerchantable as a deodorant. In either case, 
without more, the plaintiff would be entitled to go to the jury. 
However, there was also in the case expert testimony that the con-
tents of the jar used by the plaintiff were true to the formula of "Mum," 
and that the formula contained no ingredients which alone or in com-
bination would act as a primary irritant, that is, directly irritate the 
skin. There was also testimony that any person might in time become 
sensitive to a particular substance, and that such sensitivity would be 
exceptional. The Court judicially noticed the general knowledge of 
allergies reflected in the testimony. 
:This evidence was held to destroy the plaintiff's case. "Any presump-
tion of normality disappeared in the light of the evidence which tended 
to show that the deodorant and its components were not significant ir-
ritants." 3 Absent the presumption, it was held that the evidence would 
not warrant the inference that the product would have hurt a normal 
person or a significant number of persons, and therefore the plaintiff 
was left without a case for the jury. The denial of the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict was therefore held to be error. 
The decision warrants analysis and discussion. The plaintiff'S affirm-
ative evidence was in substance only that, with no past history of undue 
susceptibility on her part, the use of a deodorant purchased from the 
defendant irritated her skin. This does not of itself reach the ultimate 
issue in a suit for breach of a warranty of merchantability. As the 
Court said, "Fitness for use by a normal person is a test often stated." 4 
A more practical version of the standard is whether the product, sold 
without adequate warning, would be injurious to a significant number 
of persons.5 The fundamental question then arises, on the issue 
whether the product would injure a normal person or a significant 
number of persons, what is the precise evidential effect of the fact that 
it injured the plaintiff? Earlier cases did not foreclose the question. 
Two cases in particular, however, appear to set the stage for the Casa-
grande opinion, and therefore warrant mention. 
In Payne v. R. H. White CO.,6 the Court referred to the usual assump-
tion of normalcy with respect to condition of mind and body and the 
analogous assumption that the conduct of a person is honest, proper, 
regular, and innocent. It was there held that evidence of injury to the 
plaintiff's skin on wearing a dress, with the assumption of normalcy of 
her skin, made out a prima facie case for the plaintiff in the absence of 
evidence that she was a person whose skin was abnormally sensitive. 
The Court, however, expressly prescinded from determining the precise 
evidential effect of this assumption, pointing out that whether it be 
3340 Mass. at 555·556, 165 N.E.2d at 112. 
4340 Mass. at 555,165 N.E.2d at Ill. 
5 See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92,94, 64 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1946); Bianchi 
v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469,472·473,19 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1939). 
6314 Mass. 63, 49 N.E.2d 425 (1943). 
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deemed to operate as a presumption, an inference, or as prima facie 
evidence, in any event the defendant was not entitled to a directed ver· 
dict on that state of the evidence. 
In Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority} a suit to determine the 
value of land taken under eminent domain, in which there was no 
evidence on the question whether a sale of comparable realty had been 
free of compulsion, the trial court admitted testimony as to the sale 
price of the comparable realty over objection on that precise ground. 
Such evidence is admissible only after a finding, express or implied, 
that the sale was voluntarily made. The trial court, however, in effect 
refused to find on the question, treating it as immaterial. 
The Court said: "The propriety of an inference, or even of a tech· 
nical presumption, that the condition of a person or thing, or the con· 
duct of a person, is normal and customary, has often been recognized." 8 
The Court held that there was a presumption of voluntariness in a sale, 
and that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the trial court was 
compelled to find that the sale was not under compulsion, and therefore 
its ruling admitting the evidence (though not its reason therefor) was 
correct. 
The Epstein decision thus necessarily ruled out the possibility that the 
assumption had the effect only of an inference (which would have re-
quired a finding of fact based upon evidence on the issue of voluntari-
ness), but it left open the possibility that the assumption had the effect 
of prima facie evidence, that of both a presumption and an inference. 
The facts of the Casagrande case add, to those of the Payne and Ep-
stein situations, the crucial factor of evidence to the contrary of the 
assumption. Assuming that the Epstein holding on an analogous set of 
facts was a contra-indication to a ruling in the Casagrande case that the 
evidentiary effect was that of inference alone, which would have gotten 
the plaintiff to the jury, the Court was left with two alternatives. Con-
sistently with the Epstein opinion, it could rule either that the evi-
dentiary effect of the assumption was that of prima facie evidence, in 
which event the underlying inference would get the plaintiff to the 
jury despite the dissolution of the presumption, or it could rule that 
the effect was only that of a presumption, which meant that the plain-
tiff would lose as a matter of law because of the dissolution of the pre-
sumption by the defendant's evidence, leaving the plaintiff with no 
evidence on the ultimate issue upon which she had the burden of 
proof. The Court took the latter alternative. 
The determination of such questions is, of course, for the court, 
"which under its inherent and traditional power must decide what 
effect is to be given to evidence." e When controlling precedent is lack-
ing, the court must distill its decision from considerations drawn from 
logic, experience, common sense, and public policy, and from judicial 
notice of knowledge, both common and scientific. 
7317 Mass. 297,58 N.E.2d U5 (1944). 
81117 Mass. at 301, 58 N.E.2d at U8. 
e Commonwealth v. D'AvelIa, 11119 Mass. 642, 645, 162 N.E.2d 19,21 (1959). 
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On the merits, the decision appears to be sound. Under the Casa-
grande holding, if the plaintiff's testimony is believed by the jury, treat-
ing the assumption as a presumption compels a finding in his favor, 
despite a total absence of evidence on the ultimate issue. To avoid 
this result the defendant must come forward either with evidence that 
the plaintiff's skin is peculiarly sensitive or, as in the Casagrande case, 
with testimony that discloses the formula of the product,1° together 
with medical testimony that its ingredients are not harmful to a sig-
nificant number of persons. Such evidence, without more, entitles 
the defendant to a directed verdict.H 
To have ruled that in addition to a presumption, the assumption also 
created a logical inference, and thus constituted prima facie evidence, 
would have required a determination that there was a likelihood12 or a 
probability13 that the product would have injured a normal person or 
a significant number of persons. In the light of the erratic and unpre-
dictable incidence of individual manifestations of allergic reactions to 
substances that do not, so far as is known, adversely affect significant 
numbers of other persons (which the Court indicated was general 
knowledge, of which it took judicial notice), a determination that a 
logical inference underlies the presumption would not seem to be 
warranted.14 
It was open to the Court to have ruled that the assumption consti-
tuted prima facie evidence by judicially creating a legally permissive 
although not logical inference that would take the plaintiff to the jury. 
This would have been a strained result, however, justifiable only on 
the basis of a policy decision that the Court obviously did not choose 
to make. There is, of course, substantial support for a policy of ex-
panding the liability of manufacturers and dealers beyond generally 
recognized limits of warranty and fault so as to distribute among all 
users of a product the burden of an injury or other loss suffered 
through use by a particular individual. If such a policy is to be fol-
lowed, however, it should emanate as a change in the substantive law 
of warranty or tort, and not as an artificial and illogical appendage of 
the law of evidence. 
The Casagrande ruling differs from at least the strong intimations 
10 This the defendant may be either unwilling or unable to do. Cf. Carter v. 
Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 94, 64 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1946). 
11 To require that to defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant's evi-
dence must be believed by the jury would, of course, involve the heresy of holding 
in effect that the presumption operates to shift the burden of proof on the ultimate 
issue to the defendant. 
12 See Hobart·Farrell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Klayman, 302 Mass. 508, 19 
N.E.2d 805 (1939). 
13 See Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825, 
827 (1940). 
14 It might also be added that although the plaintiff was, of course, not bound 
thereby, the medical testimony introduced by the plaintiff, as well as that of the 
defendant, not only afforded no basis for such a determination but tended strongly 
to show the impropriety thereof. 
The plaintiff, however, would be concluded to the extent that the facts therein 
stated would be judicially noticed. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 24
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/24
§21.4 EVIDENCE 235 
of a number of earlier cases. The opinion expressly overruled the 
reasoning, although approving the result, of Graham v. Jordan Marsh 
C 0.,15 in which it was held to be error to direct a verdict for the de-
fendant, on the ground that there was an inference that the plaintiff's 
skin was normal. In Casagrande it was pointed out that the ruling was 
correct, but upon the ground that an unrebutted presumption, and not 
an inference of normality, was present. 
Exhaustive examination of earlier cases would serve no useful pur-
pose. However, it may be briefly noted that such general references 
to the possibility, probability, or actuality of an inference of normalcy 
of the skin of the plaintiff as appeared in earlier leading cases, to the 
effect, for example, that "In the absence of direct testimony about the 
sensitivity of her skin, there might be a presumption, or permissible in-
ference, that she was normal," 16 and "The jury could infer that the 
skin of the plaintiff and of each of the witnesses was normal," 17 as 
well as those in the Payne and Epstein cases set out previously in this 
section, are no longer indicative of the law of the Commonwealth. 
Finally, a word of caution should be sounded concerning projection 
of the holding in the Casagrande case. As was said in the Epstein case, 
with reference to the assumption of normalcy in general, "Much de-
pends upon the degree to which the condition or conduct is likely and 
to be expected." 18 
The Casagrande opinion dealt with the assumption of normalcy not 
in general, but only in its application to the skin, an aspect subject to 
allergy. That this limitation is important is seen in solid decisions in 
earlier cases dealing with the precise evidential effect of the assumption 
in other aspects of its application, which differ from the Casagrande 
holding and are not affected thereby. To cite only a few examples, the 
assumption was held to have the effect not merely of a presumption, 
but that of prima facie evidence, a combination of presumption and 
inference, in Moroni v. Brawders,19 on the issue of regularity and 
compliance with law in the conduct of officers of a labor union; in 
Hobart-Farrell Plumbing &- Heating Co. v. Klayman,20 on the issue 
of the delivery in due course of a letter properly stamped, addressed, 
and mailed; and in Krantz v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co.,21 on 
the issue whether a drowning victim had died as the result of suicide or 
accident. 
§21.4. Burden of proof: Responsibility of owner of motor vehicle. 
General Laws, c. 231, §85A,1 although worded ineptly, in substance pro-
HI 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946). 
16 Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 316, 149 N.E.2d 635, 639 
(1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§7.3. 
17 Carter v. Yardley Be Co., 319 Mass. 92, 94, 64 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1946). 
18317 Mass. 297, 301,58 N.E.2d 135, U8 (1944). 
19317 Mass. 48, 57 N.E.2d 14 (1944). 
20302 Mass. 508, 19 N.E.2d 805 (1939). 
21335 Mass. 703, 141 N.E.2d 719 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §33.3. 
§21.4. 1 The section reads: "In all actions to recover damages for injuries to the 
person or to property or for the death of a person, arising out of an accident or 
collision in which a motor vehicle was involved, evidence that at the time of such 
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vides that when an automobile involved in an accident is registered in 
the name of the defendant as owner, the burden of proving that it was 
operated by a person for whose conduct he was not responsible is on 
the defendant.2 Two cases decided during the 1960 SURVEY year dealt 
with the applicability of the provisions of Section 85A in fact situations 
that are not uncommon. 
In Decoteau v. Truedsson,3 an issue was whether the car admittedly 
registered to the defendant was in fact the car that was in collision with 
that of the plaintiff, upon which question there was conflicting testi-
mony. The trial judge was obviously in error in charging that it was 
for the jury to determine whether the defendant had sustained the 
burden of proving that he was not responsible for the conduct of the 
operator, while refusing to charge as requested that the plaintiff had the 
burden of proving that the defendant's car was the one involved in the 
collision before the statute came into play. 
In Pistorio v. Williams Buick, Inc.,4 the corporate defendant lent a 
car registered under its dealer's plates to another defendant, Dolinsky, 
to try it out with a view to his purchase or sale of the car to someone 
else. During the trial period, Dolinsky asked the third defendant, 
Tradd, who was in the market for a car, to take the automobile and 
look for a missing dog while trying it out. Tradd and Dolinsky in-
vited the three plaintiffs to go along and help look for the dog. The 
plaintiffs were injured as a result of grossly negligent operation by 
Tradd, and it was held that verdicts against Tradd and Dolinsky were 
proper, Tradd being the agent of Dolinsky. 
However, it was held that verdicts were properly directed for the 
defendant Williams Buick, Inc., because while Section 85A would 
place the burden on the owner to disprove its responsibility for 
Tradd's conduct in the operation of the automobile, this responsibil-
ity for the operation of the car does not include authorization to the 
operator to invite third persons to ride in the automobile, upon which 
issue the plaintiffs had the burden of proof. 
Lacking evidence of such authority in Tradd, the plaintiffs were 
left in the unhappy position of being in a position worse than that of 
trespassers, in that they had no legal standing whatever in relation to 
the corporate defendant.5 
§21.5. Opinion: Basis; probability or possibility. As usual, a 
number of cases involving the admissibility of testimony as to opinion 
reached the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1960 SURVEY year. 
accident or collision it was registered in the name of the defendant as owner shall 
be prima facie evidence that it was then being operated by and under the control of 
a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible, and absence of 
such responsibility shall be an affirmative defence to be set up in the answer and 
proved by the defendant." The section was enacted by Acts of 1928, c. gl7, §l. 
2 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Lummus in Brown v. Henderson, 285 
Mass. 192, 196-197, 189 N.E. 41, 4g-44 (19M). 
3 3g9 Mass. 759, 162 N.E.2d 772 (1959). 
41960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 859, 167 N.E.2d 850. 
5 O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mass. 12g, 140 N.E. 282 (l92g). 
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Messersmith's Case1 is a reminder of the fundamental requirement 
that an expert's opinion is relevant only if supported by proper sub-
sidiary findings. A medical opinion that was essential to the defend-
ant's claim for workmen's compensation benefits had support in facts 
that were in evidence, and were recited as such in the findings and 
decision of the single member, adopted by the board, but not in the 
findings actually made. The case was remanded for clarification of 
the findings and decision. 
The tendency of fact-finders to interweave their findings with re-
citals of testimony, without discrimination between the two, creates 
annoying ambiguities. Unfortunately, this fault is by no means limited 
to fact-finders who are (possibly lay) members of administrative tri-
bunals. 
In Milch v. Boston Consolidated Gas CO.2 there was held to be no 
support for the opinion of the expert, either in the facts of the hypo-
thetical question propounded or in the evidence as a whole, which 
was, therefore, inadmissible as mere speculation, surmise, or conjec-
ture. 
In Richmond v. Richmond,s a master, in making findings as to the 
value of household furnishings, stated that in addition to considering 
evidence presented by the parties, he had drawn upon his own expe-
rience as a lawyer over the past many years in the settlement of es-
tates, some of which involved the disposal of furniture and furnishings 
of homes as in the case before him. Objection was made that this was 
error. The Supreme Judicial Court summarily handled the issue, with-
out citation of authority, by the statement: 
Where the value of common articles of household furnishings 
is at issue, manifestly it is proper for the fact-finding tribunal; 
whether judge or jury, to have recourse to his or their own knowl-
edge and experience in considering the evidence and determining 
the value of the property.4 
While such experience as the master indicated that he had drawn upon 
might qualify him as a lay expert upon the subject, the difficulty here 
is that the master is functioning as a fact-finder and not as a witness, 
who would, of course, be subject to cross-examination. 
The holding might be thought to be too broad in that it permits 
the master to insert in the case, without external manifestation appar-
ent to counsel (and perhaps as the controlling criterion), such ex-
perience as he may have had, which may well have been isolated, 
limited, and unique, and not that which is common and usual in such 
matters. To that extent, due process is denied. 
It may, of course, be doubted whether the distinction between in-
dividual and common experience can be effectively implemented as 
§21.5. 1340 Mass. 117, 163 N.E.2d 22 (1959). 
21960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 941,167 N.E.2d 845. 
3340 Mass. 367, 164 N .E.2d 155 (1960). 
4340 Mass. at 369,164 N.E.2d at 157. 
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far as fact-finders are concerned. It appears to be a valid criticism, 
however, that the holding makes no attempt at the distinction, even as 
a matter of semantics. 
Other cases illustrated the elementary principle that, in order to get 
to the jury, a plaintiff must establish that the relation between an act 
or omission of the defendant and the plaintiff's injury must be 
shown to be that of probability and not mere possibility. The soul-
searching required of the expert witness involved in this simple dis-
tinction is indicated in Berardi v. Menicks,5 a dental malpractice case 
in which probability was held to be shown in the opinion testimony, 
and Hachadourian's Case,6 in which the opinion was held to establish 
no more than a possibility. 
5340 Mass. 396,164 N.E.2d 544 (1960). 
6340 Mass. 81, 162 N.E.2d 663 (1959). 
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